Now that you've learned a little about the Guatemalan civil war, I'll explain a little about the Peace Accords and their aftermath. This will give you guys an idea of why I find this country so fascinating, especially given my interest in crime policy. You'll probably notice that my understanding of the Peace Accords centers around issues of human rights, demilitarization, and transitional justice.
Peace negotiations in Guatemala can be divided into three phases. First, in March of 1990, the UN mediated talks between the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), Guatemalan political parties, members of civil society, and the government. Direct negotiations between the URNG and the government began without any previous cease-fire agreements. The second phase of negotiation was marked by President Serrano’s 1993 failed self-coup, which temporarily derailed negotiations. However, in March of 1994, the URNG and the Guatemalan government signed the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights and set up a calendar for continued negotiations. 1994 also saw the singing of the Agreement for the Resettlement of the Populations Uprooted by the Armed Confrontation and the Agreement on the Establishment of the Historical Clarifictaion Commission. The final phase of negotiations addressed the rights of indigenous people. Following the election of Álvaro Arzú to the presidency in 1995, both the guerillas and the government declared a cease-fire and agreed on the Accord on Socioeconomic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation and singed an agreement titled Strengthening Civilian Power and the Role of the Army in a Democratic Society. In addition, the government ceased the practice of forced recruitment and began to demobilize the Civil Patrols. Despite another setback in 1996 concerning a kidnapping scandal involving a faction of the URNG, actors on both sides of the war signed the rest of the peace accords in December of 1996, including the Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace, which put into effect all other previously signed accords.
The 1994 Human Rights Accord invited the UN Verification Mission (MINUGUA) into the country. MINUGUA employed human rights monitors, legal experts, police, and military observers to verify guerilla and government activities, raise awareness of human rights issues and to oversee the cease-fire agreement and demobilization of armed groups. The peace accords also set up Historical Clarification Commission, which was charged with investigation past human rights abuses. The demilitarization accord modified the mission of the armed forces to exclude matters of internal security, established the goal of reducing the amount of army personnel and the military budget by one third, and established a new civilian police force. The accords also called for the demobilization of the Civil Patrols, set up a constitutional reform that provided for civilian trials against military personnel accused of crimes against civilians, and authorized the president to disband the Estado Mayor Presidencial (EMP), a notorious military intelligence unit connected to the president that had been implicated in numerous assassinations of civilian dissidents.
While the peace accords laid out an ambitious, far reaching set of institutional reforms and recommendations, these reforms and recommendations were often not fully implemented or did not fulfill expectations. The Historical Clarification Commission, for example, was prohibited from assigning criminal responsibility for specific acts, and prosecutors could not use the findings of the commission in court proceedings. The commission had no power to subpoena witnesses, and the commission’s report was forbidden to publish the names of perpetrators. The armed forces cut back on their personnel, but did not reach the one-third reduction mark set by the demilitarization accord. Military spending went down through the end of 1998, but the military budget rose back to pre-peace accord levels in 1999. While the president had the opportunity to abolish the EMP intelligence unit, it was not disbanded until 2003. Although the new mission of the armed forces precludes the use of the military in matters of internal security, the military has been slow to change its geographic deployment of troops from one that favored counterinsurgency to a deployment based on national defense priorities. The demilitarization accords called for the disbanding of the Mobile Military Police and the creation of a new civilian police (PNC). Under this agreement, ex-military members can join the new PNC as long as they undergo the same selection and training process as new recruits. The government, however, has subverted this process by transferring ex-members of the military police to the Treasury Guards before moving them into the PNC and requiring only three months of retraining. According to reports from the Washington Office of Latin America in 1998, the Guatemalan PNC was one of the most corrupt police forces in Central America. Most members obtained their positions through nepotism or by buying their way onto the force, and many police officers support themselves through graft and corruption. The PNC did not screen new recruits for past human rights violations, and due to low numbers of qualified applicants, the government began accepting new recruits who had failed the entry exam.
Human rights violations continued to be a problem in Guatemala in the years following the signing of the peace accords. High crime rates and low numbers of trained police led the Guatemalan government to reintroduce army personnel into internal security functions. As little as a year after the signing of the peace accords, soldiers were patrolling both urban and rural areas, often escorted by a single police officer in an attempt to legitimize the patrols. MINUGUA reported that instead of reducing crime, these patrols often engage in criminal acts or commit human rights violations. The intelligence arm of the covert EMP, under the auspices of the Anti-Kidnapping Commando Group, was implicated in a number forced disappearances and murders in 1997 and 1998. Right-wing political forces eventually defeated the constitutional amendment restricting the military to matters of national defense in the 1999 referendum. Following this defeat, the government has for the most part ignored other peace accord agreements that addressed the reorganization of the army.
Despite the dismantling of the Civil Patrols, reports by MINUGUA describe the participation of former Civil Patrol members in rural lynchings. These reports examine 100 murders stemming from 120 lynchings over the course of two years. Former Civil Patrol members were directly implicated in many of these lynchings, most of which occurred in areas where Civil Patrols had been prominent during the civil war. In addition to lynchings, MINUGUA reported executions committed by death squads in rural areas. In 1998, groups of heavily armed, well-trained men distributed a list of alleged criminals who they had marked for death. Following the circulation of this list, the groups of armed men tortured and executed ten men whose names were on the list, dumping their bodies on the doorsteps of other alleged criminals from the list. Military officers were also responsible for the assassination of Bishop Juan Gerardi two days after the release of the Catholic Church’s report on human rights abuses during the civil war.
Matters had not improved substantially five years after the signing of the peace accords. Former dictator Ríos Montt asserted a strong influence over politics as president of Congress and founder of the ruling political party, the Guatemalan Republic Front (FRG). Death threats against judges and the kidnapping and murder of political activists continued, in large part due to the actions of clandestine death squads. These death squads also persisted in harassing, attacking, and assassinating human rights activists involved in court cases dealing with human rights abuses committed during the civil war. Peasant leaders suffered attacks from both death squads and landowners, and journalists who covered cases of disappearances and executions endured death threats and attacks.
A 2002 MINUGUA report describes how clandestine groups founded during the civil war that have transformed into powerful criminal organizations. A 2002 Amnesty International report dubbed Guatemala a “Corporate Mafia State,” a term they defined as, “[an] unholy alliance between traditional sectors of the oligarchy, some ‘new entrepreneurs,’ police and military, and common criminals.” Within this type of state, hidden powers participate in illicit activities in order to gain huge profits. These hidden powers use their political connections as well as connections within the military and the police to eliminate their competition or intimidate those who try to investigate their activities. The hidden powers often employ clandestine groups, many of which include military and police personnel, private security guards, and common criminals. While it is difficult to gather information on the armed groups, investigators believe the leaders of the clandestine groups occupied high-ranking positions within the military during the civil war.
So that brings us up to the early 2000's. Stay tuned for the next installment, which will give a short run-down of what is going on in Guatemala now.
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