Update: Agreement with Maras in El Salvador?

Former congressman and ex-guerrilla leader Raúl Mijango, who claims to have been one of the negotiators of a peace between MS 13 and Mara 18 in El Salvador, issued a statement reinforcing claims made by a Catholic bishop attributing falling homicide rates in El Salvador to this peace agreement.  The statement included words reportedly written in collaboration with both MS 13 and Mara 18 (as translated by insightcrime.org):

Since last year we have begun internally a deep process of reflection and analysis of the serious and pressing problems facing our country, of which we have been part, as a consequence of the war that we have been forced to fight due to social exclusion, marginalization, repression, and the need for survival...

We have not negotiated anything with this government, nor do we ask to, we are tired of corrupt and lying politicians ... that's why this time to accompany our process of reflection we preferred to ask for the assistance of the Church and civil society...

They have made it possible that after 20 years we have been able to reach an agreement between the two rival gangs where we have managed ... to significantly reduce the murders in the country, and, in a gesture of goodwill, to cancel all actions that include attacks against soldiers, police and guards.

 An article in El Faro reports that Mijango's statement criticizes EL Faro's coverage of an alleged agreement between the street gangs and the government. The statement called the newspaper irresponsible and unprofessional. You can see the full statement (in Spanish) by following the link to the article in El Faro.

Obviously, there is more going on here than you or I, as outsiders, can see. I have to admit I was more inclined to believe the original story of the government brokering a deal with the gangs at first, mostly because I see El Faro as one of the few trustworthy (or at least less blatantly biased) news sources in El Salvador. Yet the missive detailing the Church/civil society led true seems genuine. I wonder what prompted El Faro to run with this story. Was it so difficult to find out about a Church brokered truce? Were they obliviously ignorant of what was going on? Were they journalists misled? Or is this the truth that is now getting covered over? If this type of story had happened in Guatemala, there would already be loud accusations of the "opposition" trying to destabilize the government. But politics operate differently in El Salvador (to some extent at least, especially because there are somewhat stable political parties and the party in power at the moment was in the opposition for so long). I'll write more on this as things unfold, for those who are interested.

Negotiating with Gangs in El Salvador

Just finished reading a piece in the online Salvadoran newspaper El Faro. I'll write more of the details of this later (in the evening, perhaps, once I've finished what I need to get done for the day), but I wanted to lay out the basics here for anyone who is interested. A week an a half ago, El Faro reported on an agreement between the government and street gangs intended to reduce homicides rates. According to the report, the treaty included transferring gang leaders from maximum to minimum security prisons and other benefits for these prisoners in exchange for less gang violence in the streets. That same week, the article confirms, homicide rates fell to nearly half of what they had been the week before. This, in one of the most violent countries in the when judging according to homicide rates. The government, of course, denies these claims.

Following the publication of this investigation and another that uncovered an organized crime network that involved street gang leaders, prominent businessmen, and local politicians, El Faro journalists began to received threats. In one instance, a government official told the newspaper that gang leaders were upset with these reports and warned El Faro to remember the fate of documentary film maker Cristian Poveda (who was killed by gang members after making a documentary about the Mara 18 gang).

Most recently, a bishop in the Catholic Church has taken credit for the fall in homicide rates (averaging 5 per day, rather than the 14 per day in January and February), claiming that the Church had brokered a truce between Mara 18 and MS 13. Many doubt this story, however, as an insightcrime.org article explains, because of the lack of details in the bishop's story.

Update: Messages from Zetas in Guatemala

More banners supposedly written by the Zetas appeared in Guatemala on Wednesday supporting the claim that the message thanking President Pérez for his drug legalization proposal were not written by Zetas. One white sheet written with the message appeared hanging from a roadside sign at the entrance to a village in Chiquimula while, more ominously, another appeared wrapped around the body of a university student, who had been shot three times. Although firefighters (who operate as first responders in Guatemala) found the student alive, he subsequently died in the hospital. The message, the same on both sheets, threatened the leader of the Líder political party, Manuel Baldizon, who came in second place in the most recent presidential elections. The alleged Zetas blame Líder for posting the previous banners I commented on in my previous posts (here and here), threatening to kill the politician if other messages appear in the Zetas' name. The message read: "Baldizon hijo de tu puta madre, deja de mandar a poner mantas a nombre mío!! Yo soy el Z200 te mataré hasta el perro de tu casa y a todos los del lider att. Z200." In English: "Baldizon, you son of a bitch, stop putting up signs in my name. I am Z200 and I will kill even your dog and everyone in Líder. attn: Z200." You can read an article about this in Spanish here.

More on Zetas and Drugs in Guatemala

A quick follow-up on the last post about the banners allegedly hung by the Zetas in support of President Otto Pérez' drug legalization proposal in Guatemala:

In brief analysis of the situation from insightcrime.org, that author states that the banners were most likely the work of those wishing to make Pérez look soft on crime. He claims that the Zetas would never support the legalization of drugs because the intent of these policies is to hurt drug traffickers. Although I'm not convinced it was the Zetas who wrote these public notes, I'm not terribly convinced by this argument, either. Drug traffickers won't be happy that transporting drugs in Guatemala would be legal? I'm not saying that it wouldn't lower violence linked to drug trafficking (although who knows, perhaps it would mean higher stakes and stiffer competition for those who control Guatemalan trafficking routes?), but I hesitate to take a stance on this either way, since I don't know the details of Pérez' plan, nor the numbers in terms of how much stays in Guatemala and how much moves on to Mexico and the US. The banners do seem to be more of a hoax than anything else, but saying that the Zetas wouldn't support legalizing drugs just because the policy is intended to hurt drug cartels seems like taking too much on faith. Unintended consequences are a major issue for any public policy, and I'm sure there are forces behind these proposed policies that we don't know about.

Zetas Support Legalization of Drugs in Guatemala?

I haven't written recently due to a major work overload, but I had to share this. I'm hoping to get to a more detailed discussion of this situation soon, but for now, here's a quick summary. The new President of Guatemala, Otto Pérez Molina, has been very vocal recently about his campaign to legalize drugs in Guatemala (and to convince other countries in the region to join in this legalization) in an effort to fight narco-trafficking. This article appeared in the El Periódico newspaper today showing a banner hung on an overpass in Zone 13 in Guatemala City. The banner reads (in Spanish): Pérez y Baldetti cumplan legalizar las drogas y apoyaremos lucha contra maras. In English, it says, "If [President] Pérez and [Vice President] Baldetti legalize drugs, we will support their fight against the maras." Signed, Zetas 200. A similar sheet with similar writing also appeared in Zone 7. The newspaper calls the authors of the note "suspected Zetas," since no one knows if it was actually written and hung by members of the Zeta cartel and the people who quickly took down the sheet in Zone 13 were unidentified. According to the article, the president attributed the message to the opposition. Would legalizing drugs in Guatemala help or hurt the drug cartels? My gut response is that legalizing drugs would only hurt the traffickers if this legalization took place in their major market (the US) rather than in countries that are principally used as transportation routes. Yes, drugs are sold in Guatemala, and legalizing them might hurt the small-time drug dealers. Who benefits from legalizing the transportation, buying, and selling of drugs in a major transportation hub? Will the cartels pay taxes? I think I need to look into this further (I'm not even sure what President Pérez' proposal entails), and I'll post what I find for those of you who are interested.

Prison Fire in Honduras

I'm sure many of you have already heard about the horrifying prison fire in Honduras. Reports are now claiming that the fire started after an inmate set fire to his mattress. Hundreds are already confirmed dead, and many are still missing (presumed dead). You can read the LA Times coverage here, and the New York Times here. AP reports state that firefighters claim they could not let prisoners out of their cells because they could not locate the keys. Was this pure incompetence? I'm not sure if the ensuing investigation promised by the Honduran president will clear things up.

A friend passed along an amateur video of the blaze posted on youtube that I could not help but watch (I am a victim, like most people, of morbid curiosity). I don't really recommend you watch the video (it was not too graphic but was still disturbing). What was most interesting to me was the video linked to it. Well, not the video, really, but the comments to the video. In the amateur video of the fire, the man behind the camera keeps repeating "dios santo" and "pobrecitos" ("my god"--"poor things"). He laments what he sees as the late response of the firefighters and the obvious gunshots echoing in the neighborhood. Bystanders speculate that perhaps a bomb had exploded. But the comments to the AP report of the incident, which the first video I mention is a response to, tell another story of anger and resentment towards prisoners that I have heard in Guatemala and El Salvador as well. The comments section on youtube and other anonymous forums often attracts so-called trolls and other rancorous individuals who what to stir up trouble or vent their venom. But this does not mean that there are not people out there who honestly feel the same way as those who posted on this particular comments section. Posts demonized the victims of the blaze. One (in Spanish) dismissed the incident as justice, saying that the prisoners were going to burn in hell anyway. People wrote about how rape victims and family members of murder victims would be celebrating, and there is serious confusion as to whether this particular prison were high security or not (as if it would be less of a tragedy if the victims were murderers and more of a tragedy if they were only thieves). I wonder, does it matter what crimes these prisoners were convicted of? Is the thought of burning to death locked in a prison cell less horrifying when the victims are convicted rapists and murderers?

Are Disappearances Murder?

A fellow political scientist's blog post got me thinking about a subject I hadn't considered before, at least not in this context. The post discusses the alarming rate of disappearances in El Salvador and whether or not these disappearances should be considered gang violence, as the article by Hannah Stone that he cites suggests. The author of the blog rightly points out that it is difficult to determine what should be considered gang violence, not just as this applies to disappearances but to murders and other types of violence as well. It brings up the important question of not only how homicide statistics are gathered, but what definition of homicide is used (and what deaths are left off the list). Homicides are often used as indicators of the crime rate because, presumably, homicides do not often go unreported. Which, I think, is kind of a moot point when looking at disappearance rates or thinking of hidden graves. In some countries, criminal suspects killed by the police are not included in homicide reports even though many human rights defenders would argue that those killed are victims of murder. Some statistics include deaths due to car crashes as homicide, while others don't. It makes homicide statistics that much more murky. It also makes me curious as to what the disappearance rate is in Guatemala or Honduras, or, for that matter, Brazil or Argentina.

Pichação in São Paulo

An articlein the New York Times about graffiti in São Paulo offers an interesting twist to Kelling and Wilson's broken windows theory of crime. 

Laid out in a 1982 Atlantic Monthly article, and later in a book by Kelling and Coles (1998), the broken windows theory is, simply, that disorder and crime are inherently linked. That is, vandalism and anti-social behavior will lead to further vandalism, which will most likely lead to an escalation in crime. A building with one broken window will inevitably end up with all its windows broken--as Kelling and Wilson explain, "one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing." Areas with abandoned buildings, graffiti, broken windows, homeless sleeping on the streets, beggars, etc. are more like to attract crime due to disorder--crime rises where people aren't confident that informal controls will maintain public order. Though widely criticized by criminologists for confusing correlation with causation, the broken windows theory was a cornerstone of William Bratton's various zero-tolerance crime control policies, including Rudy Giuliani's reforms in New York other projects across Latin America. 

The article describes how gangs of angry Paulistas (citizens of São Paulo) are using a specific kind of graffiti, called pichação (from the verb "pichar," to cover with tar), to protest social and economic inequality in Brazil. Well, something like that. In the article, Djan Ivson Silva, a leader of a pichação gang, claims their work is meant "'to remind society that this city is a visual aggression to begin with, and hostile to anyone who is not rich.'" Here, vandals explicitly target areas outside the normal realm of "broken windows" for their vandalism, emerging from the marginal neighborhoods where graffiti is (presumably) already a set practice to paint politically charged symbols on skyscrapers and public monuments (I use the term marginal in English in the sociological sense of exclusion rather than the more loaded term "marginal" in Portuguese that carries with it racist and elitist connotations). The vandalism is overtly political rather than insidiously political, proclaiming its disorder in orderly places rather than, as Kelling and Wilson describe, becoming political by gradually attracting more vandalism and crime. (note: I'm sure that a quick google search would turn up quite a few articles on how pichação breeds crime.)

The photo on the left, taken from a Brazilian newspaper article on pichação, is an example of the rune-like graffiti. The words underneath says, roughly, "In a country full corruption, who has the right to criticize pinchação!"

The article also makes it seem like these gangs are not only in it for the political statement, but also for the pure competition of it. Gangs fight for the most coveted canvases for their art (that is, the tallest buildings, the most prominent public spaces), even to the point of death. It seems, in some sense, like the work of Project Mayhem--angry young men desecrating public property to prove themselves to each other and to prove that they are in on the joke, that they know what's happening and it doesn't matter what we think. It's not a perfect metaphorical fit. The men of Project Mayhem do come from the same lives as the pichação gangs, from the streets of the favelas and the poorest neighborhoods, for one (although they think they have as much grievance against society). But the parallel is there, and for me, its an interesting one.

Maras and Organized Crime

I just had an interesting conversation with a colleague about crime and justice in Central America (a topic which comes up a lot in conversation for me, unsurprisingly). One of the points my conversation partner brought up was the shift of focus in the international media away from the issue of youth gangs and towards drug trafficking, specifically when talking about Guatemala. She noted that in the past, the focus of reports on violence in Guatemala tended to lay the blame on the maras--the image of all that was wrong was the tattooed face of a teenage gangster. More recent coverage has to do more with the threat of organized crime and drug trafficking, especially the Zetas and the Sinaloa cartel. I think this has a lot to do with shifting international priorities in the region and the bloody drug war in Mexico. Drug gangs have replaced street gangs in the media as the ones who decapitate rivals and commit atrocious acts of violence. The maras and the drug cartels are, of course, intimately connected in many ways. Just as I was having this conversation, I came across an article written by another colleague on the issue of maras in El Salvador. She points out connections between the two types criminal organizations that I have seen mentioned in local and international coverage of crime in Central America: drug traffickers hire mareros as assassins, as protection along smuggling routes, and as small-time local drug dealers. The interesting thing, however, is that the maras in El Salvador make most of their money from extortion. It brings to mind passages from the political science literature on state building in Europe that reference the mafia-style way in which new states were formed through protection rackets. But are the maras considered organized crime? How much are they like the mafia, either in the US or in Italy? Is the extortion they commit anything like the mafia-type protection racket? I don't think I know enough about the US or Italian mafia or other types of organized crime to say, but I think the question is interesting.

New Start

So, with earnest good intentions, I dedicate myself once again to write at least once a week on my blog. I'm back in the US again, writing up the dissertation, so tales of my adventures are less likely to appear. But if you, dear readers, are interested in reading about Latin American politics and other interesting things related to my research that has caught my eye, give my blog another gander. Here's what I've got for you today:

NPR has an interesting story on firearms today. It looks at the history of the Glock, the Austrian handgun that has become ubiquitous in the US. According to the author of the book Glock: The Rise of America's Gun, Paul Barrett, this particular handgun became popular not only because it is easy to learn to use but because the manufacturer gave discounts to police departments for bulk orders, it was featured in movies and television, and (my favorite reason) it was featured in rap lyrics--in part because Glock was easy to rhyme with, as the author puts it, "words you might want to use in rap lyrics."

The most interesting part of the article for me, however, is Barrett's discussion of the role Glock played in the Assault Weapons bill here in the US, and how large capacity firearms like the Glock ended up on the street after police stations replaced their older weapons with new guns. For anyone interested in the connections between politics, capitalism, and crime, this interview is worth a listen (or a read, if you're so inclined).

I followed a link from NPR to this Washington Post investigation on guns in the US. The various articles linked to this page are fascinating and also worth some time to check out. I especially recommend the articles that trace the path guns follow from first sale to recovery at a crime scene.

In the meantime...

Until I get settled down in my new home (for the next nine months at least) and get to writing something more substantial, here's an interesting post written just before the Guatemalan elections that I think does a good job of talking about the elections. Check it out here.

Heading Back to Guatemala

I am heading back to Guatemala next week, so expect less sporadic posts in the weeks to come. But in the mean time, here is a link to an article on the recent violence in Guatemala from the The Guardian. Also, an interesting commentary (in Spanish) from a friend of mine who also works on the issue of violence in Central America. I'm including a quick translation of his comments into English below:

Why Petén and Not the Department of Guatemala?
by Carlos A. Mendoza
(my translation)

 The lamentable and horrible murder of migrant workers in Peten at the hands of suspected narco-terrorists raised national and international alarm over the power of organized crime in Guatemala and the violent strategies these groups use to fight their rivals. The reaction of the state, as usual, was timid, late, and inappropriate. Among other deficiencies, the security forces tried to respond with outdated legal instruments, like the Public Order Law (Decree No. 7 of the Constituent Assembly of 1965, later changed in 1970).

The Executive decreed a state of siege in the entire department of Petén, based on the above law and "[because] during the last few days there have been a series of grave acts that put the constitutional order, governability and the security of the State at risk, affecting people and families, putting life, liberty, justice, security, peace and human development at risk" (Government Decree 4-2011, May 16). 

Obviously, the massacre in Petén merits due attention from the State, but this is more a reaction to the media coverage of the macabre event rather than part of a strategic and well-planned response against organized crime, especially in zones where the presence of the State, both as law and as bureaucracy, is precarious. The criticism is founded in the fact that the authorities give the impression of not using the basic data on violent homicides to focus their efforts and effectively use their limited human resources, for as we know in Guatemala there are less than 2 policemen for every 1,000 people, or, in a territorial perspective, we have less than 19 police for every 100 square kilometers. 

The homicide rates for every 100,000 people reveals that in Petén, the violence is going down in respect to 2008, when it registered at 77 per 100,000. This fell to 71 in 2009 and made it to 60 in 2010. This explains why, with a total of 366 homicides last year, Petén rose in the departmental rankings of violent homicides, taking the 7th spot in a total of 22 departments. That is to say that in 2010 there were six departments more violent than Petén. The most violent of all was the department of Guatemala.   

According to the figures that the National Civil Police (PNC) reported, there were 2,423 homicides in the entire department of Guatemala. That is to say that 41 percent of the total homicides in the country occurred here, in the geographic, political and economic center. For a population estimated at 3.1 million (22 percent of the total population), the departmental rate was 78 homicides for every 100,000 people. That is 18 points higher than the homicide rate in Petén, and in absolute terms that is 2,057 extra deaths ( 90 percent of which were due to guns). Only 4 percent of the population lives in Petén, with a registered 6 percent of the homicides in the entire national territory. In the Department of Guatemala, the violence is totally disproportionate, practically double the expected for its population. 

The Department of Guatemala is the most densely populated in the country, almost 1,400 people per square kilometer (Petén is the least populated, with 17 people per square kilometer). At the Central American level, only El Salvador rises above this level in terms of population density, with 2,000 people per square kilometer (it also registered a homicide rate of 78 per 100,000 people in 2010). Guatemala is the department with the highest percentage of people living in urban areas (85 percent) and it has the highest score on the human development index in the country (practically at the highest level by international standards). All of these facts that let us locate the department in relation to Petén and other regions of the country and Central America make us question the validity of many hypotheses that propose to explain violence in the region. They suggest that we need a series of investigations into the causes of the problem so we can propose effective solutions.

However, the intention of my reflection is to ask why it did not occur to anyone to declare a state of siege in the Department of Guatemala? In Petén, they are trying to control more than 35,000 square kilometers of territory, [in the capital] it would be a little more than 2,000 square kilometers, but more than 3 million people (without counting those that come to Guatemala City from other parts of the country for business or to work). The state of siege seems to be an antiquated and not very applicable instrument, and the criteria the government uses to decide when to activate it or not is illogical. We are talking about human lives, but permit me to use an analogy to explain the possible cognitive bias that may be blinding the authorities in charge of citizen security. In our homes we can find two types of water leaks in the pipes and drains. On one hand, there are the scandalous leaks, when the water springs out on all sides and we shut off the water and call the plumber. On the other hand, there are the leaks that happen drop by drop, almost imperceptible until we get the water bill from the municipality and it is then that we react, if only to investigate where we can find evidence of moisture and locate the problem. This last type of leak is the most dangerous because we don't see it, because it erodes the floor slowly until it causes irreparable damage. Something like this happens to the State, it sees and reacts to a collective tragedy (highlighted by the morbid and sensational the media), but it ignores the every day victims, those that are only one number more in the official statistics. These deaths happen in the Department of Guatemala, but no one has raised the alarm. They are no longer news.   

I think my friend has some good points here. For one, I agree that the murders that happen every day in Guatemala City have become common place. They often make the news, but not in the way that the massacre in Petén made the news. The newspapers are full of reports of dead bodies found at the side of the road, men and women murdered by unidentified strangers as they go about their every day lives, stories often stripped of descriptions of context or motive. Stories reminiscent of reports of death squad assassinations during the war. This violence is no longer shocking, no longer out-of-place, no longer notable.

I understand the rhetorical question my friend poses: if they're going to call a state of siege in Petén, why haven't they called one in Guatemala City? But we must also remember that he is not suggesting that the authorities should actually declare a state of siege there. I think the take away from this commentary is that we should worry about all of the murders in Guatemala, not just the flashy massacre linked to Mexican drug cartels in the north. What do you all think? Do you agree with his assessment?

Update on Drug Violence in Peten

Just thought I'd add a quick update on the last post. Guatemalan papers reported today that white sheets with messages written on them were found hanging in Quetzaltenango and Baja Verapaz signed by the Zeta cartel. The messages read:

La guerra no es contra la población civil, ni con el Gobierno, mucho menos con la prensa, así que llévenla tranquila, es contra aquellas personas que trabajan con el Golfo y la contra. Otto Salguero es uno de los más importantes surtidores de cocaína del Golfo y los que pagaron sus vidas son trabajadores que le mantienen su organización. Prensa bájenle tanta mamada antes de que la guerra sea contra ustedes, el que avisa no es traidor. Atte. Z. 200

In English:

The war is not against the civilian population, nor against the Government, even less against the press, so stay calm, the war is against those people that work for the Gulf Cartel and the other. Otto Salguero* is one of the most important cocaine suppliers for the Gulf Cartel and those that paid with their lives are workers who maintain his organization. News media, stop making such a fuss** before the war starts to be against you, you've been warned***. Attn: Z 200

The police caught three suspected Zetas as they were hanging one of these sheets.

From what I understand, there is a long history of the drug cartels intimidating journalists in Guatemala, particularly in the northern departments. I'm keeping my fingers crossed that things don't start to get even more out of hand.


*Otto Salguero is the owner of the ranch where the massacre took place.

**Not quite an exact translation, but you get the picture..."bajenle tanta mamada" is a phrase I'm not very familiar with. Literally translated it means something like "don't give so many blowjobs."

***This literally translates to "he who warns is not a traitor," but is better understood as a common saying that comes out in English something like "Forewarned is forearmed" or "Don't say I didn't warn you" or, as I've translated it here, simply "you've been warned."

Drug Violence in Guatemala

I'm not sure how many of you all who read this follow the news about Central America, so I thought I would share this news story with you. I'm a little behind the times on it, but I'll plead typing exhaustion due to a combination of dissertation writing and research assisting.

So here's what's going on. Last Sunday, May 15, 27 bodies were found decapitated on a ranch in the northern Guatemalan department of Peten.  The LA Times article about the massacre does a good job of covering the situation, and I recommend taking a look. It's one of the few articles I've found in English. The article says that witnesses report around 200 armed men arriving in buses at the ranch. Official estimates place the number around 40. The perpetrators wrote warnings to the owner of the ranch in blood on the walls of one building, threatening that they were coming after him next. From what I can gather, the victims were temporary ranch workers who had been recently hired. The sole survivor of the massacre, a woman who worked at the ranch, reported that the perpetrators told her that they were Mexican, that they did not like Guatemalans and that they were killing people because the worked at the ranch. Most reports suggest that the culprits are members of the Zetas, a Mexican drug cartel that has been moving into Guatemala over the last few years. I've written about the Zetas in Guatemala in a previous post. At the time the LA Times article was written, commentators were speculating that the murders were linked to the assassination of the brother of a suspected drug trafficker committed two days earlier. The ranch owner's drug-trafficking brother had been killed in 2008, allegedly by the Zetas.

In response to the massacre, Guatemalan President Alvaro Colom declared a state of siege in the department of Peten. This BBC report (in Spanish) describes how this is not the first notable action by the Zetas in Peten in the last year--in October of 2010, ten vehicles loaded with armed men on their way to pick up a cocaine shipment got caught up in a shoot-out with police on a ranch near the Mexican border. President Colom had declared a state of siege in the department of Alta Verapaz in December because of drug violence there.

As this Siglo 21 article reports (again, in Spanish), Guatemalan police and military personnel pursued three suspected Zetas in an operation that ended in a gunfight that left two suspects dead. The article stresses that the suspects have not yet been linked to the May 14th massacre, and I haven't looked for an update on this yet. Interestingly, the article also notes that the police have begun to investigate the owner of the ranch, on the assumption that since he is being targeted by the Zetas, he must be involved in drug trafficking. According to this source, the woman who survived was spared because she was pregnant.

An article from a Mexican newspaper links the massacre to an ex-Sergeant Major in the Guatemalan Army, citing a radio interview with Colom. In the interview, Colom draws a parallel between the May 14th massacre and massacres committed during the civil war. The one survivor of the gunfight between the police/army and the suspected Zetas was a member of the Guatemalan armed forces during the war. Apparently, many of the former members of death squads joined the Zetas after the signing of the 1996 Peace Accords.

This massacre has, of course, thrown things into an uproar, especially because this is an election year. I read an abridged transcript of a radio debate between the top two candidates for the presidency, and they dug into each other over public security issues. Sandra Torres, the UNE candidate who is married to the current president (but who is filing for divorce so she can legally run for president) called Oscar Pérez, the PP candidate, a coward, partially because he shrunk the size of the military while he was Security Commissioner during the Berger administration (a reduction of the military was part of the Peace Accords). Torres basically accuses him of creating the drug trafficking routes throughout the country by decommissioning military bases. Pérez, in return, accuses Torres of being responsible for the massacre because of her role in the Colom presidency. He flat out says that Torres has been "co-governing" the country and that she's the one that tells the president what to do. Therefore, she is responsible. Sounds like a rather brutal debate to me, and one that will probably be repeated as the September elections draw closer.

I'm sharing this all with you for a few reasons. First, I find it concerning that the drug violence so publicly committed in Mexico is again becoming visible in Guatemala. Drug violence has been around for some time, but with the exception of the decapitated heads found in Guatemala City last year (one was even found on the steps of the Congress building), this type of massacre hasn't been seen since the civil war ended. I wonder what it means if the dark forces that have stayed (somewhat) below the radar for the last decade or so are coming back out into the light again. Second, it's been interesting reading the reader's comments on the news articles posted online. Quite a few of them revolve around whether the readers thought the media coverage of the massacre was too sensational, a topic that I am obviously interested in. I wonder how this type of incident affects people's feelings of safety. This was an atrocity committed in a remote place, remote at least to those living in the capital city. It could be that people will not pay too much attention once some time has passed, given that this was something that happened so far away. Gang attacks on buses are a more pressing problem for those who have to take a city bus to work. But, on the other hand, the victims were innocent laborers, people who had done nothing wrong. These were not drug dealers taking out other drug dealers. Finally, I wonder if this will affect the election. About six months before the 2007 presidential elections, a number of Salvador politicians were murdered by Guatemalan policemen, and, in turn, the policemen who were captured were murdered in a prison riot, allegedly by members of a death squad. These incidents, unsurprisingly, led to a huge scandal. But the scandal did not have much political impact (from what I can tell) in terms of having an effect on the election. Will this most recent scandal push people to vote for heavy-handed policing and the promise of a stronger military presence in public security? Or will it be forgotten four months from now?

News Coverage of Mexican Drug War

If you are interested in following US news coverage of the Mexican drug war, the LA Times has an interesting section on their webpage that groups together all of their stories relating to drug trafficking and drug related violence in (or connected to) Mexico. It is all collated by date, but you can also get the stories listed by dateline, byline, or type of article (video, story, etc.). It would make a great resource for looking at US media coverage of the issue.

 One of the articles in the special section address the problem of drugs coming in through Central America. It looks at the case of El Salvador in particular, a country that, in the past, hasn't really seen the same type of drug trafficking as Guatemala has. The story also reports that the police have found a cocaine lab in Honduras, evidence that the Mexican cartels are making their own cocaine (an enterprise that has long been a Colombian monopoly), and even Costa Rica is complaining about an influx of Mexican drug traffickers. According to the article, more than 60 percent of the cocaine that reaches the US arrives via Central America, a number attributed to US State Department sources. El Salvador has become a more popular route for trafficking because of a new highway that bisects the northern region built in part with US funding and because the official currency is the US dollar, which makes it easier to launder money.

Two things in particular struck me about this article. First, the report describes a town in Chalatenango, where drugs coming in from Honduras are repackaged and shipped on to Guatemala. We just finished reading a book about guerrilla warfare in the political science class I am a TA for that describes the FMLN presence in a small town in Chalatenango, and it brings home some of the connections between the violence of the civil war and the violence that the drug trade brings with it. Second, the ads included at the side of the page when you read the article online are all for Mexican and Central American vacations, a somewhat ironic twist given the content of the article. I have seen some coverage of how/if the drug violence has been affecting tourism in Mexico, but not much coverage as to how it might be affecting Central America. Granted, El Salvador isn't exactly a tourist magnet like Costa Rica. But Guatemala, for example, earns about 2.2 percent of its GDP from tourism (in 2009, according to Prensa Libre). I have no idea if that is a big percentage or not, but I do know that Guatemala has made a huge effort in recent years to boost tourism.

Finally, to round out this post, I want to point you all to a photo gallery at boston.com that includes some striking images of the drug war in Mexico. The images are certainly arresting, but what stuck out the most for me about this photo gallery is that some of the more grisly images were censored. Ok, not censored in that they were altered, but some of the photos are left black with a warning notice that says:

Warning: This image contains graphic or objectionable content. Click here to view it.

The captions of the pictures are not blacked out, however, so you can get an idea of what the image is before you decide if you want to see it. Such a disclaimer/warning is an interesting way to get around the issue of being too sensational, too voyeuristic, too graphic when covering violence. It also reminds me of the news that came out a week or so ago about Mexican news agencies agreeing on guidelines on how to cover drug violence without glorifying drug bosses and putting their journalists at risk.

Nepotism Laws and Presidential Divorce

Just in case you haven't been following this story (see here, here and here, too), Guatemalan politics have once again taken a strange turn. As with all good political intrigues, this tale includes a woman some have called the power behind the throne, a high-powered divorce,  allegations of corruption, an opposition candidate with a shady military past, and lots of money.

The Guatemalan Constitution forbids the close relatives of the incumbent president and vice-president to run for president, a nepotism law put in place as a impediment to the establishment of presidential dynasties. Why is it important to know this small piece of Guatemalan law, you ask? Because the wife of the incumbent president, Sandra Torres de Colom,* has announced her intention to run for the highest office in the elections this September. Initially, Torres argued that her candidacy was legal because she is not a blood relative of President Colom, but rather a relative by marriage. After the courts ruled that her definition of "close relative" did not hold up, the couple announced that they would be filing for divorce. That's right, divorce. If she is no longer married to the president, then she can be a legitimate presidential candidate. At least that is, unless the current legal challenges to this political maneuvering hold up in court.

Sandra Torres is a controversial figure in Guatemala. She is the face of Colom's social programs, and has a strong following in rural areas, where the Mi Familia Progresa (My Progressive Family), a conditional cash transfer program, has raised living conditions for many indigenous women. The Mi Familia Progresa program, however, has been pinned with numerous allegations of corruption and embezzlement, and Torres herself has been accused of corruption, fraud, and misuse of public funds. She was also implicated in the murder of a lawyer in 2009, a bizarre case that I wrote about in previous posts (here and here). Both Torres and her husband were cleared by the CICIG of being involved in the Rosenberg murder, but accusations of corruption still hover around the presidential couple.

The presidential election in Guatemala this fall will be quite an interesting spectacle. The last presidential election in 2007 was one of the bloodiest on record, with over 50 politicians killed in the six months leading up to election day. Many of the deaths were attributed to "common crime," but it is most likely the case that most of these murders were politically motivated. Hiring assassins is apparently a relatively cheap and easy way to defeat your political rivals. This election season may or may not be as bloody as 2007, but it has certainly be fraught with controversy so far. The Economist article that I link to above puts the situation in easy to understand terms, so I'll quote it here:

Ms Torres is not the only candidate running on dubious constitutional grounds. Álvaro Arzú, a former president, is campaigning despite a ban on re-election. Zury Ríos, a congresswoman, may be blocked by a prohibition on the relatives of the organisers of coups, since her father, Efraín Ríos Montt, toppled a government in 1982 and installed himself as dictator. Eduardo Suger, another possible candidate, was born in Switzerland and may not meet the requirement to be “Guatemalan in origin”. “Ministers of religion” are forbidden from running too, which might spell problems for Harold Caballeros, the founder of a large evangelical church.

One of the few candidates free of constitutional entanglements is Otto Pérez Molina, a former general who narrowly lost a run-off vote to Mr Colom in 2007. Mr Pérez Molina is the strong favourite: a recent poll put his support at 43%, with Ms Torres next on only 11%. In 2007 he promised an “iron fist” against crime. Since then Guatemala has become far more dangerous, as Mexican cocaine smugglers have put down roots in the wild jungle areas near the northern border. After four years of the soft-spoken Mr Colom, some Guatemalans might fancy an ex-army man to drive the gunmen back across the frontier (The Economist March 24, 2011).

 When I was in Guatemala last summer, may people told me they thought that Otto Pérez would be the next president. Not because of his policies, or because of his popularity, but because he came in second in the 2007 elections. I heard from a number of sources that that is how politics work in Guatemala. The runner up of the previous election will win the current one. Berger can in second to Portillo in 1999 and won in 2003. Colom came in second to Berger in 2003 and won in 2007. The logic goes that people want to vote for whoever they think will win. So they say, anyway. I guess we'll find out in September. Or December, if it comes to a run-off. If no one gets 50 percent of the vote in the first round of elections (which is tough to do, especially if there are 14 presidential candidates like there were in 2007), then there will be a run-off election a few months later between the top two candidates.

* a note on Guatemala surnames: Most Guatemalans use two last names, one being their mother's name and the other being their father's name. The first last name is the father's family name, and the second last name is the mother's family name. When addressing someone, you would use the father's family name (the first last name). So, for example, Otto Pérez Molina is often called Otto Pérez, and if you were speaking to him in person you would call him Sr. Pérez (or perhaps General Pérez?). This is why President Colom, whose full name is Alvaro Colom Caballeros, is called Colom and not Caballeros. For married women, the name changes a bit. When a woman gets married, she drops her mother's family name and places her husband's first last name after her father's family name, with a "de" (of) in between. Hence, Sandra Torres de Colom. Make sense?

***Update: As pointed out to me by a friend currently living in Guatemala, Arzú's candidacy has been ruled unconstitutional and images of his wife have begun to appear on posters around the city. I seem to remember seeing something about this in the news recently. Since Arzú is not currently president, his wife is free to run. (Thanks, Sophie, for the heads up on this!)

Article on Rosenberg in the New Yorker

If any of you out there are interested in reading a New Yorker article about the Rosenberg murder I wrote about in this blog post, follow this link. I really recommend taking the time to read it. It says a lot about politics in Guatemala. Stranger than fiction...

Persona Management Software

This morning I followed a twisty path from my Facebook newsfeed to this blog post to, finally, this blog post.What magnetic force pulled me forward up this ladder of links, you ask? A concept that both my social science side and my science fiction side found fascinating (and not all that surprising, really): the government/political organizations/interest groups are developing/have developed/have implemented new software that creates a fictional persona with an online presence that is indistinguishable from a real person. Ok, so far, other than from a more metaphysical or philosophical standpoint, this doesn't sound that threatening. But, as Happy Rockefeller writes in his Daily Kos blog, the nefarious purpose of such fictional online personae is to manufacture opinions, Facebook statuses, tweets, and online commentary in an effort to influence public attitudes.

With persona management software, an employee can control multiple automated personae, building each virtual person from false accounts on a plethora of interconnect social networking sites. False accounts, that is, in the sense that these people do not exist outside of the internet. Instead, they exist on thumb drives or on servers, made up of a series of RSS feeds, retweeted tweets, and made-up social networking profiles. Much of this has come out in leaked emails taken from a defense contracting firm, HB Gary, by the hacker group Anonymous. Rockefeller quotes from the email, and I'll repost it here:

Using the assigned social media accounts we can automate the posting of content that is relevant to the persona.  In this case there are specific social media strategy website RSS feeds we can subscribe to and then repost content on twitter with the appropriate hashtags.  In fact using hashtags and gaming some location based check-in services we can make it appear as if a persona was actually at a conference and introduce himself/herself to key individuals as part of the exercise, as one example.  There are a variety of social media tricks we can use to add a level of realness to all fictitious personas.

Both bloggers linked above point out that the purpose of these false personae is to plant fake opinions out there in cyberspace. These fictitious personae can post comments on blogs, retweet opinions for or against controversial topics, or bring up arguments or counterarguments no yet in the public consciousness. An attitude, opinion, or stance that may have only a small following in "real" life can seem overwhelmingly large when fake people are loudly supporting it.

But what does this creation of false virtual personae really mean, beyond the ability to flood the market (so to speak) with opinions that are not necessarily held by that many people in the "real" world. First, cyberspace is already a skewed space. I don't know if anyone can argue that the opinions we see on Facebook, Twitter, etc., is representative of the population. For now, I'm thinking of the smaller world of US politics, but this could certainly be widened to include other parts of the world. There is a certain type of person that gets online and posts, and not just in terms of money (you have to have at least some money to own a computer and have internet access...although that is debated in terms of facebook and tweeting, given the more wide availability of cellphones, etc.). Not everyone who has a cell phone or a computer posts their political opinions online. And we should already be aware (although I think some people forget this) that just because a group has a loud presence online doesn't mean it is actually powerful, cohesive, or large. People who are talking about politics online are already a self-selected group.

I wonder, too, what these false personae represent on a more philosophical level? Perhaps my literary friends who are well versed in the tropes of science fiction in general and cyberpunk in particular can address this question better than I.

Finally, this begs the question if shooting "false" opinions out into cyberspace really changes "real" people's opinions. I think this has something to do, first, with new research that shows that given the fragmentation of news media in the digital age, consumers seek out media outlets that are closest to their own political ideology. That is, lefties tend to watch John Stewart, conservatives are more likely to watch Glenn Beck. Your political leanings tend to determine which media you are exposed to. So does this argument extend to virtual personae? Would opinions expressed by false accounts only reach those who already share that opinion? Is this like preaching to the choir? A mechanism of reinforcement rather than change?

Second, the theory that these false personae can change people's opinions depends on the theory that people are easily lead. Josh Clark, in his How Stuff Works blog, explains:

...[U]nder the bandwagon technique a tweet that shows support for union labor is trumped by 50 replies that suggest unions are bad for America. We like to be on the winning team, generally, so we may be swayed by the 50:1 ratio against the concept of unions, which germinates into personal opinion, which may be disseminated in to others throughout one’s lifetime. All this without any real information.

I understand the logic here, but I'm not sure if I agree that public opinion works this way. Which I guess is a bit funny, coming from me, since I'm writing about how news media coverage of crime in Latin America influences public opinion. But the more research I do on the topic, the more it seems that people's opinions can be sharpened or a topic can be made more salient, but it is very hard to actually change someone's opinion. And I am very skeptical of the idea that the weight of numbers is all it takes.

This is not to say that I think that the use of persona management programs is benign. I'd like to see some research on this "bandwagoning" of opinion. I'll have to do a bit more digging on the subject (I'll report back if I find anything). Is this really how things work?

But even if this isn't how you change people's opinions, it is still nothing to sneeze at to be able to more firmly confirm already held opinions. These false personae could easily help to cement already held views once people see evidence that more people think like them. Again, reinforcement rather than change.

Dark Tourism

I just read an article off of someone's facebook page about "dark tourism" in Mexico (if you click the link, it's in Spanish...all you English speakers are forewarned). I had never heard of such a thing (well, ok, I had, but not by that name). It evokes such an interesting image, this idea of dark, or morbid, tourism. The article talks about "narco" culture, tourists visiting the sites of famous massacres or going into the northern border towns to look for a little peek at something dangerous. On top of this macabre search for the sensationalized, glorified trappings of the drug cartels, tourists are also looking to experience the darker side of poverty and oppression. The article describes organized groups heading to Chiapas to visit the poor indigenous regions famous for the Zapatista uprising and a tour in an ecological park in central Mexico that simulates the experiences of illegal immigrants crossing the desert to get into the US.

On the one hand, you have people looking for adventure, something dangerous, a glimpse of a life that they can only see in the movies, a way to satiate their morbid curiosity. On the other hand, you have people who are traveling to educate themselves (or at least they are trying to convince themselves of this), people who want to see first hand how the world really works, how those less fortunate suffer. It is perhaps a way that some feel they can show compassion for their fellow humans. But I am not convinced that this type of tourism is any different than the first kind, no less motivated by morbid curiosity, no less voyeuristic. I have a hard time wrapping my head around foreign tourists paying for the privilege to suffer dehydration and exhaustion in the desert and humiliation at the hands of fake border patrol officers in an attempt to understand what it is like to be an illegal immigrant. Is this really how we can find compassion? It reminds me somewhat of the slum tours offered in places like Rio de Janeiro or Mumbai. Tourists, often very well-meaning tourists, want to get a real life glimpse of the infamous shanty towns, perhaps in an attempt to put a human face on poverty. But can we really understand life in a favela by going on a tour? Are we not, by the very act of observing, of "touring," changing the slum? I have great respect for those who commit their lives to working with people living in slums and shanty towns, but I have no desire to go on a tour there. It feels too much like voyeurism.

Of course, dark tourism is not a new phenomenon. Think back, for example, to the wagons full of spectators at the battle of Bull Run during the US Civil War.  And the category of dark tourism should not be limited to witnessing dark acts as they are happening. We can also include visiting areas that have suffered war or tragedy long after the actual events occurred. We could include here Revolutionary War reenactment, visiting Ground Zero in New York City, making pilgrimages to Civil War battlegrounds, or walking the grounds of Auschwitz. This is not to say that there are not other reasons to visit these sites (if you'll forgive the double negative). I do not want to discount those who visit such places as an act of respect for the dead. But there is still this fascination with the gruesome, the awful, the brutal, acts of war and crime and mass murder, that pulls us in, a motivation that lies beyond the idea that we should witness depravity in order to prevent it in the future. Please do not think that I am advocating here that we forget the victims of the Holocaust or of the 9/11 attacks or of any civil war. There is truth to the cliche that when we forget the past we are doomed to repeat it. But I think it is important to question the motives behind any kind of dark tourism, to be aware of the aspects of sensationalism and spectacle embedded in it.

You should google "dark tourism" and see what comes up. One site promotes a Charlie Manson tour of LA (visiting the places his "family" committed those infamous murders). You can visit the "killing fields" in Cambodia or tour the war-torn cities in Bosnia. One article divides dark tourism into five subcategories: grief tourism, disaster tourism, suicide tourism, poverty tourism, and doomsday tourism. It's a fascinating topic (perhaps morbidly fascinating?).

Guatemala Argentina Connection

A friend recently sent me an interesting editorial from the Argentine newspaper Página 12 that I wanted to share with you all. You can read the full article (in Spanish) here. The article neatly dovetails into my own research, and reinforced for me the reason why this topic is so interesting. The reference (for those of you keeping track) is: Natanson, José. "Inseguridad y política." Página 12 January 23, 2011. I should note here that the word inseguridad literally translates to "insecurity," but not in the way that most of us think of insecurity. This is not the idea that someone is not confident in themselves. Here, insecurity means not safe. There is probably a better way to translate this word so that this meaning of "not safe" comes through, but for the sake of time I'll keep using "insecurity."

To introduce the topic, Natanson writes, "Last week's episodes of insecurity reactivated the debate over lowering the age of criminal responsibility...and the laws that apply to [minors]. Like a plague, this topic disappears and reappears from time to time, with nuances that change according to the moment and the political-electoral debate." Already, I like where this is going. Not, of course, that there was some kind of crime that shocked the country. Apparently, Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires brought up the issue of lowering the age of criminal responsibility in the aftermath of a highly publicized murder committed by a fifteen year old. What I like about this is that Natanson is expressing something that I'm trying to talk about in my dissertation: that support of "iron fist" policies, such as lowering the age of criminal responsibility, comes and goes and often has to do with elections.

The article goes on to talk about the fact that, first and foremost, lowering the age of criminal responsibility has not been proven to have any impact on crime. He connects this policy with the zero tolerance policies of Giuliani in New York (rightly so) and points out many of the reasons why the apparent success of these policies disappear when you take a closer look--the reduction of crime in New York may have had more to do with rising economic prosperity and less to do with zero tolerance. He moves on from New York and travels south to Central America, where iron fist/zero tolerance policies have also been largely futile (and perhaps even counterproductive). Finally, someone else who makes the comparison between Central America and Argentina! He points out that Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras all have low age limits on criminal responsibility (children between 12 and 13 years can be charged with a crime) and have some of the highest homicide rates in the world. It's interesting to see such a comparison between Argentina and Central America. Whenever I talked about my project with (most) Argentines, they were shocked that there were places in Latin America that are more "dangerous" than Buenos Aires (with the possible exception of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil...because everyone has an idea that that city is dangerous, apparently).

But it was the analysis that followed that really drew my attention, and I'm going to do my best to translate it for you  here (please forgive the imperfect syntax, I translated this on the fly):

The politics of security in the province of Buenos Aires, the heart of the problem of insecurity in Argentina,  has been one of the most erratic and dangerous of all those implemented since the return to democracy, as a simple recounting of the ministers [of public security] shows: from León Arslanian to Carlos Ruckauf, passing to Juan Pablo Cafiero, to return again to Arslanian, until we arrive at Carlos Stornelli y Ricarco Casal. But let's break it down. It's necessary but relatively easy to debate against the defenders of penal poplulism; what is harder is to try to understand why progresivism has so many problems taking up the topic and offering if not a solution, then at least a proposal for a solution. The left always preferred to bypass the question of security: except for the two shortened terms of Arslanian in Buenos Aires and the applied focus of Hermes Binner when he assumed the governorship of Santa Fe, there are practically no relevant experiences of progressive politics of security. The fact that Kirchnerism, which has made change one of the keys to its political success, has taken seven years to make a strong showing of its willingness to change things reveals the difficulties of handling this issue. How do we explain this sloth? The logical rejection by the left of the use of repression, any form of repression, generated during the dictatorships, created a vacuum of knowledge that today has become costly. There are few experts that really know about this issue and that have any relationship with the police or some kind of accumulated experience: only a few, like Arslanian or Marcelo Saín, and a handful of institutions like CELS have dedicated themselves to systematically working on the question of security with a focus that is not mano dura (iron fist). 

To this historical rejection we must add a simplistic diagnosis--considering insecurity an automatic subproduct of poverty--which excludes any possibility of resolving this problem in the meantime. To say, as Pino Solanas said in the last electoral campaign, that the principal cause of insecurity is infant mortality is perhaps true, but it contributes little the debate over what to do about young murderers or chop shops or drug trafficking mafias entrenched in the slums, and there does not cease to be in the background the path of ingenious evasion of an issue for which it is difficult to take a concrete position. The problem is...those on the right have constructed an answer, certainly a wrong answer but an answer none the less, that provides a doctrine, a package of measures and all the paraphernalia of foundations and teams ready to apply it. It should not be a surprise that they are the ones that are ahead in the public debate.

However, here is a fact that is difficult to fit in this column. Insecurity does not define elections. Felipe Solá was reelected after designating Juan Pablo Cafiero, and Daniel Scioli was elected with an opposing discourse. Aníbal Ibarre was elected without a single proposal on this, and Mauricio Macre could be elected again even though he has not demonstrated great advances in the fight against crime. Insecurity was absent in the Kirchnerist platform in the presidential election of 2007 and despite this, Cristina won easily.  Carlos Ruckauf, the electorally successful case of mano dura most often mentioned, did not get into the 1999 provincial elections because of his promise to shoot thieves but because of electoral alchemy that permitted him to add the votes for Domingo Cavallo, without which he would have lost. This does not imply, of course, that insecurity is not an important social worry, but my hypothesis is that it does not win elections. Not yet.

 And that is what makes crime and insecurity such a fascinating topic for me. Citizens are concerned with crime in both Argentina and Guatemala, despite the huge differences in terms of aggregate levels of homicides, violent crime, etc. This is, of course, partially a matter of perspective. Knowing that Guatemala City can be more dangerous than Buenos Aires in terms of homicide rates does not make a person in Buenos Aires feel safer. But crime as a political issue varies greatly across Latin America. An expert on Venezuela recently told me that Hugo Chavez has made political statements about crime that takes the statement that poverty creates crime to the extreme, becoming an apologist for criminals (in essences saying, look, wouldn't you commit crime, too, if you were living as they do?) and putting off crime control efforts.  I haven't confirmed this myself, but I wouldn't be surprised. But how do you combat crime while still avoiding the repressive measures of past dictatorships and civil wars? Many countries in Latin America have dealt with crime (often labeled as political crime) through violent repression, and the mano dura policies now supported by the right are reminiscent of this brutal past. Populations who lived in terror of being picked up by military patrols are now supporting the return of military patrols to the streets. How do you get the public to support such efforts? How do you deal with these things in light of impunity, corruption, incompetence, and lack of resources?

*note: The photos of stencils included here were taken by a friend in Buenos Aires in June of 2010. Politically themed stencil graffiti has become a widely used art form, especially in the neighborhood of San Telmo and surrounding areas. The first one reads: "If memory doesn't exist, all that is ours is suicide." The second reads: "Never again?" Both of these are referencing the Dirty War in Argentina that left between 9,000 and 30,000 citizens dead (disappeared) following heavy repression from the military government. I am guessing that this first stencil is referring to the dictatorship even though it does not do so openly because the idea of memory was (and is) a widely discussed topic during the truth commissions investigation, during the trials against military officers for crimes against humanity, and even now that the amnesty given to military officers in the 1990s are now being overturned. The second one refers specifically to a slogan used by activists and human rights groups to support the truth commission charged with investigating the disappearances of political prisoners during the military period. I'm guessing this stencil is making a statement about political repression under democracy, particularly the (rumored) presence of death squads within the police. I included these photos because it brings into focus a very important part of this debate over crime control that is like the white elephant in the room for many: the past history of repressive policing and the blurry line between political and common crime, both in Argentina and in Central America.